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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
Appellee/Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID G. CANNON, 
Appellant/Petitioner. 
Utah Supreme Court 
Case No. 20000024 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 981194-CA 
Priority No. 12 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Utah Court of Appeals correctly affirm appellant's conviction for child 
abuse, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109? 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion in the case of Provo City v. Cannon. 
Case No. 981194-CA on December 2, 1999. A copy of that decision is attached in the 
Addendum to this Brief in Opposition. 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case was entered on December 2, 
1999. This Court has jurisdiction to grant or deny a petition for a writ of certiorari to 
review the decision of the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(5) 
and § 78-2a-4. 
1 
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CONTROLLING STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109(l)(c):
 # 
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of a child which impairs 
the physical condition of the child, including: 
I 
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin; 
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion; 
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or 
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's health or welfare and 
which is not a serious physical injury as defined in Subsection (l)(d). 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109(l)(d): 
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set of injuries which ( 
seriously impairs the child's health, or which involves physical torture or causes 
serious emotional harm to the child, or which involves a substantial risk of death to 
the child, including . . . 
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional harm, 
severe developmental delay or retardation, or severe impairment of the \ 
child's ability to function: . . . 
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or failure to thrive or 
malnutrition that jeopardizes the child's life. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109(3)(a): ( 
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, having the care or 
custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict physical injury upon a child is
 i 
guilty of an offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor;... 
9 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 23, 1998, David G. Cannon was convicted of child abuse, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109, after a bench trial before the Honorable Gary D. 
Stott. Defendant, contending that the City did not offer any proof of a physical injury to 
the child, moved for dismissal of the charges at the close of the City's case-in-chief The 
trial court denied the motion, and judgement was entered on the guilty verdict. 
Sentencing was stayed when the trial court entered a Certificate of Probable Cause 
pursuant to Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defendant appealed from the 
judgment to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court's judgment and filed its decision on December 2, 1999, in which Judges Norman H. 
Jackson and Gregory K. Orme concurred in the opinion of Judge Pamela T. Greenwood. 
Defendant appeals from the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In its opinion in the case, the Utah Court of Appeals adequately set forth the facts 
of this case, as follows: 
On March 13, 1996, defendant held the nine-month-old son of 
Christine Armstrong over the railing of defendant's third-story apartment 
balcony. Several witnesses observed the incident including defendant's 
wife, Cami, who told defendant to stop. Defendant then pulled the child 
back over the railing, and a neighbor took the baby from defendant. 
3 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I ! 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED APPELLANT'S 
CONVICTION FOR A VIOLATION OF UTAH'S CHILD ABUSE STATUTE, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-5-109(3)(a), IN HOLDING THAT 
PHYSICAL INJURY CAN INCLUDE ACTS THAT IMPERIL * 
OR THREATEN A CHILD'S HEALTH OR WELFARE WITHOUT AN 
ACTUAL PHYSICAL IMPACT ON THE CHILD, 
The legislature's language defining "physical injury" is not ambiguous and 
controls the meaning of physical injury throughout the child abuse statute.1 Specifically, 
the legislature's definition of "physical injury"in Utah Code Annotated §76-5-109 does 
not limit physical injury to conditions that are a result of physical impact. The statute's 
definition of "serious physical injury" encompasses injuries that can result from 
nonphysical abuse.(Opinion, paragraph 11) 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109 (l)(d) sets forth conduct that inflicts or imposes 
physical injury on a child, and yet does not result in physical impact on a child. Section 
76-5-109 (l)(d) states that "serious physical injury means any physical injury or set of 
injuries which seriously impairs the child's health,.. . or causes serious emotional harm 
to the child, or which involves a substantial risk of death to the child . . . . " Thus, this 
section is not limited to injuries caused solely by physical impact. 
'See citations and principles of statutory construction in paragraph 10 of the 
Opinion of the Court of Appeals. 
4 
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109 (l)(d)(vii) states that a serious physical injury 
includes "any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional harm, severe 
developmental delay or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's ability to 
function." Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109 (l)(d)(x) adds that "any conduct which 
results in starvation or failure to thrive or malnutrition that jeopardies the child's life" is 
also considered a serious physical injury. 
Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals was correct in determining that, under Utah's 
child abuse act, physical injury can include acts that imperil or threaten a child's health 
and welfare without an actual physical impact on the child. (Opinion, paragraph 14) 
Furthermore, the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987), cited the Utah Supreme Court as follows: 
one of the fundamental rules of statutory construction is that the statute 
should be looked at as a whole and in light of the general purpose it 
was intended to serve; and should be so interpreted and applied as to 
accomplish that objective. In order to give the statute the implementation 
which will fulfill its purpose, reason and intention sometimes prevail 
over technically applied literalness. Andrus v. Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 
109, 404 P.2d 972, 974(1965). 
Appellant Cannon, in sum, is asking this court to reject the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals and apply to his conduct a technical literalness that would not comport 
with the general purpose and objective of the child abuse statute. 
In Jones, another child abuse case, the defendant was convicted of child abuse and 
appealed. Jones argued that the then-existing section 1(c) defined "serious physical 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
injury" as "any physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death." Jones 
equated "any" with "one," and argued that since not one of the occurrences created a | 
substantial risk of death, Jones could not be guilty under the statute. Id. at 401. 
In responding to defendant's contention in Jones, the Utah Court of Appeals 
I 
explained one of the purposes of the act, stating, "To limit the definition of'serious 
physical injury' to one individual 'injury' in the literal sense would thwart the major 
1 
purpose of the act, which is to curb the increase in child abuse by imposing stiffer 
penalties on child abusers." Id. at 402 (emphasis added). The Utah Court of Appeals 
further explained that "the Legislature has provided in the child abuse act a definition [of i 
injury] which is expansive and clear" Id at 402 (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, in Jones, the defendant argued that physical injury and serious 
physical injury were "two totally self-standing and independent concepts." Id. at 402 n.3. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that the definitions were "part of an integrated and 
carefully drawn statute" particularly when "the text introducing the definitions makes 
clear that the definitions are to be used throughout the entire statutory section." Id. Thus, 
the definitions contained within the child abuse act are expansive, and should be 
construed in the light of their legislative purpose, to curb the increase in child abuse by 
imposing stiffer penalties on child abusers. Simply put, definitions of terms introduced in 
preceding or subsequent sections of the child abuse statute apply throughout the entire 
statute. 
6 
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The Utah Court of Appeals, in defining the term "imperil/1 looked to the term's 
ordinary and accepted meaning as required by Versluis v. Guaranty National Companies* 
842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992). The Utah Court of Appeals found that the ordinary and 
accepted meaning of "imperil" is to "endanger," and the trial court found that the 
defendant had endangered the baby's life by suspending him over the third-story balcony 
for several minutes. (Opinion, paragraph 13). 
Thus, the appellate court's reading of the statute's terms was correct because it was 
in line with the legislative intent behind the statute and was in conformity with the terms' 
ordinary and accepted meaning. 
The facts of this case are undisputed. There is no question that intentionally and 
knowingly suspending a nine-month-old baby by his arms over a third-story balcony 
railing for several minutes is conduct that imperiled and endangered this baby's health 
and welfare. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
When interpreting Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109 as a whole the Utah Court of 
Appeals was correct in concluding that, under Utah's child abuse act, physical injury can 
include acts that imperil (endanger) or threaten a child's health and welfare without an 
actual physical impact on the child. Therefore, the Utah Court of Appeals was correct in 
affirming appellant's conviction of chid abuse. 
7 
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For these reasons, the Utah Supreme Court should deny appellant's Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari and affirm his conviction of child abuse. 
Dated this 2^ day of February 2000. 
Vernon F. Romney 
Attorney for Provo City 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this 2_ day of February 2000, 
two (2) true and correct copies of this Brief in Opposition to Appellant's Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari to Thomas H. Means 245 North University Avenue, Provo, Utah, 84601 
l/^y^p^ Q /C0>*T*+ 
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ADDENDUM 
Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, dated December 2, 1999. 
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FILED This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. [1FP fl 9 1QQQ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Provo City, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
David G. Cannon, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CXWRTOFAPPEA1 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 981194-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 2, 1999) 
1999 UT App 344 
Fourth District, Provo Department 
The Honorable Gary D. Stott 
Attorneys: Thomas H. Means, Provo, for Appellant 
Vernon F. Romney, Provo, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme. { 
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge: 
H1 Defendant David Cannon appeals his conviction for child 
abuse, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-109 (1999) .l We conclude the trial court properly applied < 
the statute and affirm his conviction. 
BACKGROUND 
12 On March 13, 1996, defendant held the nine-month-old son of 
Christine Armstrong over the railing of defendant's Third-story 
apartment balcony. Several witnesses observed the incident, 
including defendant's wife, Cami, who told defendant to stop. 
Defendant then pulled the child back over the railing, and a 
neighbor took the baby from defendant. 
1|3 Christine Armstrong, accompanied by two witnesses, went to 
the Provo City Police Department on April 23, 1996, to report the 
incident. Sergeant Gary Hodgson met with the women and 
1. Section 76-5-109 was amended in 1997, 1998, and again in 
1999. No substantive changes were made in any of these 
amendments; we therefore cite to the most recent version of this 
statute, even though defendant was charged with the offense on 
January 7, 1£97. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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subsequently interviewed defendant concerning the allegations. 
On May 24, 1996, defendant voluntarily submitted to questioning 
and denied the allegations. 
H4 Based on the witnesses1 statements made during Sergeant 
Hodgson's investigation, the county attorney filed child abuse 
charges against defendant under section 76-5-109 of the Utah 
Code.2 At trial, defendant moved to dismiss the charges after 
the State presented its case, arguing the State had offered no 
evidence of a physical injury as required by the- statute. The 
trial court denied the motion,3 and defendant rested without 
presenting a defense. The trial court then convicted defendant 
of one count of class A misdemeanor child abuse.4 Defendant 
2. Defendant was charged under subsection (3) of the child abuse 
statute, which states: 
Any person who inflicts upon a child physical 
injury or, having the-care or custody of such 
child, causes or permits another to'inflict 
physical injury upon a child is guilty of an 
offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, 
the offense is a class A 
misdemeanor; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is 
a class B misdemeanor; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, 
the offense is a class C 
misdemeanor% 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(3) (1999). 
3. In denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the 
trial court stated: 
Well, as I read the statute, I find that 
physical injury as defined in subsection (4)-
of that paragraph, as [the Deputy County 
Attorney] has referred to it, as any other 
condition which imperils, and the other 
condition in this instance may well be the 
condition of placing the child over the 
railing, which would imperil the child's 
health or welfare. That is a factor of the 
physical injury as defined by the statute. 
4. Defendant urges us, alternativelyr to conclude his conduct 
was either reckless or negligent.and reduce his conviction to a 
class B or C misdemeanor. His argument on this point, however, 
consisted of a one-sentence footnote at the end of his appellate 
brief. We therefore decline to address it. See Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9); State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). 
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appeals, arguing the trial court erred by ruling his conduct fell 
within the purview of the child abuse statute. 
ANALYSIS 
1|5 The precise issue before us is whether the trial court 
correctly determined that Utah!s child abuse statute and its 
definition of "physical injury" can be applied to the facts of 
this case. Defendant contends the State presented no evidence 
establishing a physical injury or an impairment to the child's 
physical condition. Our analysis is thus limited to whether 
defendant "imperil[ed] the child1s health or welfare" even though 
there was- no physical impact on the child. "The interpretation 
of a statute is a question of law, which we review for 
correctness." State v. Lowder. 889 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1994) 
(citing State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993)). 
1|6 When "construing a statute, our primary purpose f"is to give 
effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose 
the statute was meant to achieve."1" Wilson v. Valley Mental 
Health, 969 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). In 
doing so, we assume "the Legislature used each term advisedly, 
and we give effect to each term according to its ordinary and 
accepted meaning." Versluis v. Guaranty Nat' 1 Cos.. 842 P.2d 
865, 867 (Utah 1992). "[W]e look first to [the statute's] plain 
language as the best indicator of the legislature's intent and 
purpose in passing the statute. Only if that language is 
ambiguous do we turn to a consideration of legislative history 
and relevant policy considerations." Wilson, 969 P.2d at 418 
(citation omitted); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1999) 
("The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall 
not apply to this code . . . . All provisions of this code . . . 
shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms 
. . . . " ) ; In re K.T.S., 925 P.2d 603, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
That the parties disagree about the meaning of a statute does not 
necessarily make the statute ambiguous. See Derbidcre v. Mutual 
Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "fA 
statute is ambiguous [only] if it can be understood by reasonably 
well-informed persons to have different meanings.1" Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 
P.2d 231, 233 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). 
^7 The statute in question, section 76-5-109 of the Utah Code, 
prohibits the intentional, knowing, reckless, or criminally 
negligent infliction of a physical injury on a child. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-109(3). Subsection (1)(c) of that statute 
defines "physical injury" as:*' 
an injury to or condition of a child which 
impairs the physical condition of the child, 
including: 
-a 
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(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin; 
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion; 
(iii)failure to thrive or malnutrition; or 
(iv) anv other condition which imperils the 
child's health or welfare and which is 
not a serious physical injury as defined 
in subsection (1)(d). 
(Emphasis added.) 
H8 A separate provision of the statute defines "serious 
physical injury," in part, as: 
any physical injury or set of injuries which 
seriously impairs the child's health, or 
which involves physical torture or causes 
serious emotional harm to the child; or which 
involves a substantial risk of death to the 
child, including: 
(vii) any conduct toward a child which 
results in severe emotional harm, severe 
developmental delay or retardation, or severe 
impairment "of the child's ability to 
function; 
(x) .any conduct which results in starvation ... -..:. 
or failure to thrive or malnutrition that 
jeopardizes the child's life. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(1)(d) (1999).5 
19 Defendant argues that, under the statute's scheme, the plain 
meaning of "physical injury" requires a physical impact on a 
child. Specifically, he points to the examples of physical 
injuries listed in subsections (1)(c)(i), (ii), and (iii)--each 
of which involves a physical impact--and argues that the meaning 
of "imperil" in subsection (1)(c)(iv), to be consistent with the 
other subsections, must require a physical impact. Because the 
5. The determination of whether a defendant inflicts "physical 
injury" or "serious physical injury" also determines the degree 
of offense. A defendant who inflicts serious physical injury can 
be charged with a greater degree of criminal liability, ranging 
from a class A misdemeanor for criminally negligent conduct-to a 
second degree felony for intentional or knowing conduct. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2) (1999). 
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State presented no evidence that defendant's conduct had a 
physical impact on the child, defendant contends he did not 
imperil the child1s health or welfare and thus his conviction 
cannot stand. 
HlO We first acknowledge that the Legislature has the power to 
define statutory terms as it wishes, and we are bound by those 
definitions. See 1A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction § 20.08 (5th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1999) (citing 
McWhorter v. State Bd. of Registration for Proffl Ena'rs, 359 So. 
2d 769 (Ala. 1978)). Even if the chosen definition in this case 
"does not coincide with the ordinary meaning of the words," id., 
the definition is not "arbitrary, [does not] result in 
unreasonable classifications [and is not] uncertain.11 Id. 
(citations omitted). Furthermore, the definition is consistent 
with the rest of the statute as a whole and its general purpose, 
"which is to curb the increase in child abuse by imposing stiffer 
penalties on child abusers.11 State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted). The Legislature's 
chosen language defining "physical injury" therefore controls the 
meaning of"that term throughout the statute.6 See Sutherland 
Stat. Constr. § 20.08., at 90. 
^11 We do not read the statutory definition as requiring some 
physical impact in order to imperil a child's health or welfare. 
Nowhere in the statute does the Legislature indicate physical 
injury is limited only to conditions resulting from a physical 
impact. In fact, the opposite is true. The statute's definition 
of "serious physical injury" includes injuries that can result 
from nonphysical abuse. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(1) (d) (vii) 
("any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional 
harm, severe developmental delay or retardation, or severe < 
impairment of the child's ability to function"); id. at § 76-5-
109(1) (d) (x) ("any conduct which results in starvation or failure 
to thrive or malnutrition that jeopardizes the child's life"). 
Likewise, under the Legislature's definitional rubric, "physical 
injury" may include conditions that are not the result of 
physical impact. i 
1^12 Our reading of subsection (1) (c) comports with our previous 
declaration about these definitions. In Jones, the defendant 
argued that "physical injury" and "serious physical injury," as 
defined by the statute, were "two totally self-standing and 
independent concepts." 735 P.2d at 402 n.3. We rejected that 
notion, stating the definitions were part of "an integrated and 
carefully drawn statute," especially because "the text 
6. Because we conclude the statute's language is not ambiguous, 
we need not consider the Legislature's intent in passing section 
76-5-109. See Wilson. 969 P.2d at 418. 
c; 
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introducing the definitions makes clear that the definitions are 
to be used throughout the entire statutory section." Id. 
Hl3 The statute, however, does not define "imperil"; we thus 
look to the term's ordinary and accepted meaning. See Versluis, 
842 P.2d at 867. Webster's defines "peril" as "exposure to the 
chance of injury," Webster's Dictionary 581 (New Rev. Updated Ed. 
1999), and "imperil" as to "endanger." Id. at 418.7 
Endangerment is precisely what the trial court found occurred in 
this case when defendant, for some unfathomable reason, suspended 
an infant by his arms over a third-story balcony railing for 
several minutes. Defendant does not challenge the trial court's 
finding that this conduct imperiled the child, given the 
definition approved by this court and applied by the trial court. 
Kl4 Thus, under Utah's child abuse act, physical injury can 
include acts that imperil or threaten a child's health or welfare 
without an actual physical impact on the child. Consequently, we 
affirm defendant's conviction. 
^ R ^ u ^ ^ /• 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Kl5 I CONCUR: 
^ > ^ ^ % ^ ys?S&>&W'p 
rman H. Jackgfcfn, J u d g e 
Hi6 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Gregory Kj/Crme, Judge 
7. We note that our reading of ''endangerment" is in line with 
other jurisdictions' interpretations of statutes using the term. 
See, e.g.. State v. Deskins, 731 P.2d 104, 105-06 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1986); People v. Odom, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1028, 1032-33 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1991) . 
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